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Within the literature on emotion and behavioral action, studies on approach-avoidance
take up a prominent place. Several experimental paradigms feature successful
conceptual replications but many original studies have not yet been replicated directly.
We present such a direct replication attempt of two seminal experiments originally
conducted by Chen and Bargh (1999). In their first experiment, participants affectively
evaluated attitude objects by pulling or pushing a lever. Participants who had to pull
the lever with positively valenced attitude objects and push the lever with negatively
valenced attitude objects (i.e., congruent instruction) did so faster than participants who
had to follow the reverse (i.e., incongruent) instruction. In Chen and Bargh’s second
experiment, the explicit evaluative instructions were absent and participants merely
responded to the attitude objects by either always pushing or always pulling the lever.
Similar results were obtained as in Experiment 1. Based on these findings, Chen and
Bargh concluded that (1) attitude objects are evaluated automatically; and (2) attitude
objects automatically trigger a behavioral tendency to approach or avoid. We attempted
to replicate both experiments and failed to find the effects reported by Chen and Bargh
as indicated by our pre-registered Bayesian data analyses; nevertheless, the evidence in
favor of the null hypotheses was only anecdotal, and definitive conclusions await further
study.
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Introduction
Several prominent psychological theories (Frijda, 1986, 2007; Lang and Bradley, 2008) state that
at the core of an emotion is the tendency to act. In order to survive, organisms need to approach
reward and avoid danger or punishment. These tendencies to act, it is argued, manifest themselves
in part through emotions. Other psychological theories also assume a link between action and
evaluation (e.g., Lang et al., 1990; Cacioppo and Gardner, 1999; Neumann et al., 2003; Strack and
Deutsch, 2004). Empirically, there is ample evidence for an association between affective evaluation
and some kind of approach and avoidance behavior (e.g., Solarz, 1960; Chen and Bargh, 1999;
Rotteveel et al. Chen and Bargh (1999) revisited
Rotteveel and Phaf, 2004; Krieglmeyer and Deutsch, 2010). What
remains unclear, however, is the precise nature of this associa-
tion; some researchers have argued that it is basic, direct, and
default (e.g., Chen and Bargh, 1999; Duckworth et al., 2002),
whereas others have argued that the association is more flexi-
ble and goal orientated (e.g., Bamford and Ward, 2008). This
debate was initiated with the publication of the article by Chen
and Bargh (1999) entitled “Consequences of automatic evalua-
tion: Immediate behavioral predispositions to approach or avoid
the stimulus.”
In the field of emotion and approach-avoidance behavior, the
Chen and Bargh (1999) article (henceforth CB) has attracted a
lot of attention (cited 866 times, January 19th 2015). In their first
experiment, one that may be considered a conceptual replication
of an earlier experiment (Solarz, 1960, cited 214 times, January
19th 2015), CB instructed participants to evaluate attitude objects
affectively by pulling or pushing a lever. Participants who had to
pull the lever for positively valenced attitude objects and push
the lever for negatively valenced attitude objects did so faster
than participants who had to pull for negatively valenced atti-
tude objects and push for positively valenced attitude objects. In
other words, the results showed a congruency effect between the
affective valence of attitude objects and the direction of the lever
movement—it is easier to pull (i.e., execute a “toward yourself ”
movement) for positively valenced objects and to push (i.e., exe-
cute an “away-from yourself ” movement) for negatively valenced
objects.
In their second experiment, CB manipulated congruency
within participants and eliminated the explicit evaluative instruc-
tion. Specifically, participants were instructed to respond to
the mere presentation of the attitude objects; in one block
of trials, participants had to push the lever (i.e., execute an
“away-from yourself ” movement), and in another block they
had to pull the lever (i.e., execute a “toward yourself ” move-
ment). The results again demonstrated a congruency effect:
pulling was faster for positively valenced attitude objects, and
pushing was faster for negatively valenced attitude objects.
On basis of these results, CB concluded that (1) attitude
objects are automatically evaluated; and (2) attitude objects
automatically trigger a behavioral tendency to approach or
avoid.
Since the publication of CB, numerous papers have been
published in which approach and avoidance behavior was stud-
ied; however, the automatic link between affective evaluation
and approach-avoidance tendencies was often simply taken for
granted. To complicate matters, different results have been
obtained using different experimental paradigms such as the
manikin task (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2001), the joystick task
(e.g., Eder and Rothermund, 2008), the joystick with zoom
task (e.g., Rinck and Becker, 2007), and a button stand task
(e.g., Rotteveel and Phaf, 2004). One issue with such conceptual
replications of approach and avoidance behavior concerns con-
struct validity. That is, different operationalizations in conceptual
replications can tap different psychological processes reflecting
partially different constructs that vary in their relation with
the conceptualization of approach and avoidance as in the CB
studies.
Replication is at the core of the scientific effort to further our
understanding of the empirical world. Many effects do replicate
reliably across laboratories in psychology (e.g., Simons, 2014), but
some prominent effects are now under doubt (e.g., Pashler and
Wagenmakers, 2012). Although opinions differ with regard to the
extent of this “replication crisis” (e.g., Pashler and Harris, 2012;
Stroebe and Strack, 2014), the scientific community seems to be
shifting its focus more toward direct replication. For instance,
several journals recently proposed special issues on replication
(e.g., Nosek and Lakens, 2014, this issue of Frontiers in Psychol-
ogy) or even launched a new type of article (i.e., Registered Repli-
cation Reports in Cortex, Perspectives on Psychological Science,
Attention, Perception, and Psychophysics, and other journals (see
Chambers, 2013; Wolfe, 2013); for an overview see https://osf.io/
8mpji/wiki/home/).
Direct replications benefit from preregistration of design
and analysis plan, ensuring a clean separation between which
analyses are pre-planned (i.e., confirmatory, hypothesis-testing)
and which analyses are post-hoc (i.e., exploratory, hypothesis-
generating; see e.g., De Groot, 1956/2014; Wagenmakers et al.,
2012). Such separation is also required for the proper statistical
interpretation of the results. When an initial finding replicates
successfully in a preregistered setting, this raises researchers’ con-
fidence that the effect is real and can form the basis for more
empirical as well as theoretical work. When an initial finding fails
to replicate, however, scientific effort may be re-oriented toward
other, more promising avenues of investigation—at least when
null results are published and do not disappear in the file drawer
(e.g., Rosenthal, 1979; Francis, 2013). Direct replications not only
affect one’s confidence about the veracity of the phenomenon
under study, but they also increase our knowledge about effect
size (see also Simons, 2014; but see also Stroebe and Strack, 2014).
Our decision to replicate the CB studies was motivated in part
by a recent meta-analysis on approach and avoidance behavior
including 29 published studies and 81 effect sizes (Phaf et al.,
2014), which indicated a moderate publication bias for con-
gruency effects with explicit affective evaluation as obtained in
Experiment 1 of CB. More importantly, to the best of our knowl-
edge the CB findings were never replicated directly. This is
remarkable, particularly in light of the central importance of the
CB findings in the literature on emotion and approach and avoid-
ance behavior. For these reasons we attempted to replicate the
original CB findings using a similar experimental setup (i.e., a
lever, see Figure 1), similar stimuli, and similar instructions. To
remove all researcher’s degrees of freedom in the analysis stage we
used a preregistered protocol on the Open Science Framework1
(e.g., Open Science Collaboration, 2012). This protocol detailed
the design, method, hypotheses, as well as the entire analysis plan.
In direct replication studies it is essential to be able to quan-
tify evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. In addition, it is
desirable to collect data until the results are compelling. Nei-
ther desideratum can be accomplished within the framework of
frequentist statistics, and this is why our analysis of both experi-
ments will rely on hypothesis testing using the Bayes factor (e.g.,
Edwards et al., 1963; Berger and Mortera, 1999; Wagenmakers,
1https://osf.io/wxigz/.
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FIGURE 1 | The experimental setup of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.
The 100 cm lever is fixed to base with a hinge. Two identical weak springs
make sure that the lever will return to mid position after responding.
Responses were recorded whenever the lever reached 15.6◦ of movement
backwards and 15.3◦ of movement forwards.
2007; Rouder et al., 2009, 2012; Wagenmakers et al., 2012). The
method section below provides the details of our design and anal-
ysis methodology. This research follows a strictly confirmatory
protocol as described in Wagenmakers et al. (2012).
Experiment 1
Method
Pre-Registered Sampling Plan
A frequentist analysis would start with an assessment of the effect
size of Experiment 1 from CB which would then form the basis
of a power analysis to determine the number of participants that
yields a specific probability for rejecting the null hypothesis when
it is false. This frequentist analysis plan is needlessly constraining
and potentially wasteful: the experiment cannot continue after
the planned number of participants has been tested, and it can-
not stop even when the data yield a compelling result earlier
than expected (e.g., Wagenmakers, 2007). Here we circumvent
these frequentist limitations by calculating and monitoring the
Bayes factor (e.g., Edwards et al., 1963; Berger andMortera, 1999;
Wagenmakers et al., 2012; Rouder et al., 2012). The Bayes factor
quantifies the change from prior model odds to posterior model
odds; in other words, the Bayes factor quantifies the extent to
which the data shift our opinion away from one hypothesis and
toward another. A Bayes factor of 5 in favor of the null hypothe-
sis, for example, indicates that the data are 5 times more likely
to occur under the null hypothesis than under the alternative
hypothesis. For the interpretation of evidence in the Bayesian
paradigm, the intention with which the data are collected is irrel-
evant; hence, the Bayes factor can be monitored as the data come
in, and data collection can be terminated at any point (Berger and
Wolpert, 1988; Rouder, 2014; see also Figures 2, 3).
Based on the above considerations, our sampling plan was as
follows: We set out to collect a minimum of 20 participants in
each between-subject condition (i.e., the congruent and incon-
gruent condition, for aminimumof 40 participants in total). Next
we planned to monitor the Bayes factor and stop the experiment
whenever both critical hypothesis tests (detailed below) reached a
Bayes factor that could be considered “strong” evidence (Jeffreys,
1961); thismeant that the Bayes factor should be either 10 in favor
of the null hypothesis, or 10 in favor of the alternative hypothesis.
The experiment was also to be stopped whenever the maximum
number of participants was reached. This number was set to 50
participants per condition (i.e., a maximum of 100 participants in
total). Additionally, the experiment was to be stopped by January
1st, 2014 if neither criteria were met. The latter date was, how-
ever, amended on OSF on January the 7th and reset to January
31st 2014 because the Bayes factor had not reached the pre-set
level of strong evidence and the maximum number of partici-
pants had not been reached either. From a Bayesian perspective
the specification of this sampling plan was needlessly precise; we
nevertheless felt the urge to be as complete as possible. In the end,
data collection was terminated because the maximum number of
participants was reached.
Participants
We recruited 100 students (23 male, mean age= 21.2 year, SD=
0.42; Congruent: 10 male; Incongruent: 13 male) from the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam. All participants were rewardedwith course
credits or e5. Only students with Dutch as their native language
were allowed to participate. One participant did not meet this
criterion and was excluded from further analysis. All partici-
pants were informed about the procedure with an information
brochure and subsequently signed an informed consent form.
Materials
Participants were seated in a dimly lit room at approximately
one arm length’s distance in front of a computer monitor. A
100 cm long lever (see Figure 1) triggered one of two switches
upon being pulled or pushed for, respectively15.6 or 15.3◦ (Note
that CB report a movement of 10◦ in both directions with a lever
measuring 92 cm). Participants held the lever at a marked height
of approximately 68 cm resulting in actual hand movement of
18.7 cm forwards and 19 cm backwards. In CB’s experiments
actual hand movements were 12 cm in both directions assuming
participants were holding the lever at the same height as in our
experiment2. Both switches were connected to the computer so
that response latencies as well as movement direction could be
recorded. Responses were recorded using a mechanism based on
a Logitech G400 gaming mouse. Polling rate of the mouse was
set at 500 S/s, response latency was less than 3ms. Start of lever
movement was recorded by polling the mouse position every
screen refresh (16.667ms). This means start-of-response latency
could be anywhere between 3 and 16.67ms. To ensure that the
lever returned to the central position after each response, two
identical weak springs were connected to the lever at the front
and at the back. These springs were added to the experimental
setup to make sure that the lever would return to mid position
after responding. On the few occasions that the lever was not
2We contacted John A. Bargh for help in designing our experiments.
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FIGURE 2 | Development of the log Bayes factor as a function of
the number of participants per condition for good judgments in
Experiment 1. N1 = sample size in the positive-pull condition; N2 =
sample size in the positive-push condition; BF01 = Bayes factor in favor
of the null hypothesis; H0 = null hypothesis; H1 = alternative
hypothesis. The horizontal black dashed line indicates complete
ambiguous evidence, and the horizontal dashed gray lines indicate
strong evidence either in favor of the null hypothesis [i.e., log(BF01) ≥
log(10)] or in favor of the alternative hypothesis [i.e., log(BF01) ≤
log(1/10)].
FIGURE 3 | Development of the log Bayes factor as a function of
the number of participants per condition for bad judgments in
Experiment 1. N1 = sample size in the negative-pull condition; N2 =
sample size in the negative-push condition; BF01 = Bayes factor in
favor of the null hypothesis; H0 = null hypothesis; H1 = alternative
hypothesis. The horizontal black dashed line indicates complete
ambiguous evidence, and the horizontal dashed gray lines indicate
strong evidence either in favor of the null hypothesis [i.e., log(BF01) ≥
log(10)] or in favor of the alternative hypothesis [i.e., log(BF01) ≤
log(1/10)].
returning tomid position by itself, participants were instructed to
move the lever back to mid position themselves. We used almost
the same attitude objects (henceforth “targets”) as were used in
the original CB study and reported in Bargh et al. (1992). The tar-
gets were first translated (see Tables 1, 2 in Supplementary Mate-
rial) from English to Dutch, and then back-translated to check
for any inconsistencies. Inconsistent targets were replaced with
comparable alternates in order to approach the original stimuli
as closely as possible in Dutch (i.e., “hangover” was replaced with
“misselijkheid” which means “nausea”; “Reagan” was replaced
with the name of the current Dutch prime-minster “Rutte”). Stu-
dents from the University of Amsterdam (n = 130) then eval-
uated these targets in a test session on an 11 point scale (from
very bad−5 to very good+5) and the resulting mean evaluations
were compared to the mean evaluations of the original stimuli
(Bargh et al., 1992). Targets that differed substantially in their
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affective evaluation (e.g., “beer”; “priest”; “clown”) were excluded,
as well as targets that differed more than 1.5 points on aver-
age from the original ratings of Bargh et al. (1992; see Table 2
in Supplementary Material). As can be expected, the valence of
the remaining 78 targets (i.e., 39 positive targets and 39 negative
targets) correlated highly with the affective valence of the origi-
nal stimulus list (r = 0.98). Due to a programming mistake, the
negative target “wormen” (“worms”) was replaced by the positive
target “stereo” (“stereo”), a word from the practice session. Data
obtained with “stereo” was excluded from further analysis so in
the end responses to 39 positive words and 38 negative words
were included in the results. These targets were presented in a
random order and every target was presented only once in a lower
case “Times” font on a white background.
Procedure
After reading the information brochure and signing an informed
consent form, participants were seated in front of the computer
screen with the lever next to their dominant hand, after which
they read the procedure of the experiment off the screen. Partic-
ipants were asked to classify the targets presented on the screen
as either “good” or “bad” (for the exact wording of the specific
lever movement instructions see Appendix A in Supplementary
Material). Participants had to do this by either pushing the lever
away from themselves, or pulling the lever toward themselves.
The participants were alternately assigned to either the congru-
ent or the incongruent condition. In the congruent condition,
participants were instructed to pull the lever toward themselves
if the target had a “good” meaning and push it away from them-
selves to indicate a “bad” meaning. In the incongruent condition,
these instructions were reversed and participants had to pull the
lever toward themselves if the target had a “bad” meaning and
push it away from themselves to indicate a “good” meaning. Par-
ticipants were instructed to release the lever after responding in
order for it to return to its starting position. In case the lever
did not return to its starting mid position itself participants were
asked to return the lever themselves to its starting position.
Before the start of the actual experiment we confirmed that
participants understood the instructions correctly by making
them perform 10 practice trials with 10 separate targets that were
not part of the 78 target words (except for “stereo,” see Table 2
in Supplementary Material). After the practice trials the exper-
imenter left the room, so that the actual trials were completed
without the experimenter present.
During the experiment each target appeared on screen
until the participant pulled or pushed the lever above the
15.6 and 15.3◦ angle, respectively, necessary to trigger the
response-switches. The computer recorded the time delay
between the appearance of the target, the onset of the lever
movement, and the triggering of the response-switch as specified
before. The computer also recorded whether the lever had been
pulled or pushed. After every response the target disappeared
and it took 4 s until the next trial commenced and a new target
appeared again at the center of the screen. The targets were pre-
sented in a random order with every target appearing once only.
After responding on the last trial the experimenter returned to
the room to thank and debrief the participant.
Preregistered Data Analysis and Presentation of
Results
Based on the reasoning of CB and our own pilot tests, all trials
with latencies greater than 3000ms or smaller than 300ms were
excluded from further analysis (pulling with “good” judgments:
1.7%; pulling with “bad” judgments: 2.2%; pushing with “good”
judgments: 1%; pushing with “bad” judgments: 1.2%).These cri-
teria for outlier removal had been specified in the preregis-
tration document. Whereas CB removed only latencies greater
than 4000ms, we had to reduce this value because pilot test-
ing showed that in our setup one can easily push/pull the lever
under 4000ms. As in CB, and as specified in the preregistra-
tion document, the dependent measure for all analyses was the
mean log(10)-transformed response latency for every partici-
pant. Results are reported as untransformed response latencies.
The crucial hypothesis concerns the interaction that describes
the congruency effect. Specifically, the congruency effect can be
decomposed in two directional hypotheses: the first hypothe-
sis states that participants respond faster to a positive target by
pulling instead of pushing a lever; the second hypothesis states
that participants respond faster to a negative target by pushing
instead of pulling a lever. As specified in the preregistration doc-
ument, the two crucial hypotheses will be assessed separately by
means of two default Bayes factors for unpaired, one-sided t-
tests as outlined in Rouder et al. (2009) and Wetzels et al. (2009).
Specifically, the effect sizes under the alternative hypothesis are
assumed to follow a folded Cauchy(0,1) distribution. Exploratory
analyses will vary the shape of this prior to probe the robustness
of our conclusions.
As described above, Bayes factors quantify the support that
the data provide for the null hypothesis vis-a-vis the alternative
hypothesis. Support in favor of the alternative hypotheses con-
stitutes support in favor of the effects reported by CB in their
Experiment 1.
Results
Bayes Factor Hypothesis Tests
For “good” evaluations, pulling the lever was a little faster (M =
1147ms, SE = 29) than pushing (M = 1165ms, SE = 30,
see Table 1) whereas for “bad” evaluation, pushing the lever was
(M = 1204ms, SE = 35) faster than pulling (M = 1267,
SE = 39). The direction of these effects is consistent with the
results reported by CB. However, the Bayes factor (assuming
equal variances, as was done for all analyses reported in this
manuscript) indicated that the observed data were more likely
under the null hypothesis than under the alternative hypothe-
sis; specifically, BF01 = 4.51 for “good” evaluations (i.e., the
data for “good” evaluations are almost five times more likely
under the null hypothesis than under the alternative hypothesis)
and BF01 = 1.95 for “bad” evaluations (i.e., the data for “bad”
evaluations are almost twice as likely under the null hypothesis
than under the alternative hypothesis). Figures 2, 3 display the
development of the log Bayes factor as a function of the number
of participants per condition for the “good” and the “bad” eval-
uations, respectively. Log Bayes factors larger than zero provide
evidence for the null hypothesis; log Bayes factors smaller than
zero provide evidence for the alternative hypothesis. For “good”
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TABLE 1 | Response latencies in ms (SE) for lever movement in
Experiment 1 and for Experiment 2 (∗ in Experiment 1 response latencies
reflect good vs. bad judgments whereas response latencies in Experiment
2 reflect responses to good vs. bad words).
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Pull Push Pull Push
Good* 1147 (29) 1165 (30) 562 (13) 571 (14)
Bad* 1267 (39) 1204 (35) 574 (12) 562 (13)
FIGURE 4 | A robustness analysis for the data of good judgments from
Experiment 1. The log Bayes factor log(BF01) is plotted as a function of the
scale parameter r of the Cauchy prior for the effect size under the alternative
hypothesis. The dot indicates the result from the default prior, the horizontal
black dashed line indicates complete ambiguous evidence, and the horizontal
dashed gray lines indicate strong evidence either in favor of the null hypothesis
[i.e., log(BF01) ≥ log(10)] or in favor of the alternative hypothesis [i.e., log(BF01)
≤ log(1/10)].
evaluations, after testing 11 participants per condition, the Bayes
factor fluctuated around three, indicating anecdotal to moderate
evidence in favor of the null hypothesis (see Jeffreys, 1961, for a
categorization of the evidential strength provided by the Bayes
factor). For “bad” evaluations, the Bayes factor initially indicated
moderate evidence in favor of the null hypothesis. However, after
testing 27 participants per condition, the Bayes factor gradually
decreased, and indicated only anecdotal evidence in favor of the
null hypothesis at the end of the data collection.
Exploratory Analysis
To probe the robustness of our conclusions, we varied the shape
of the prior for the effect size under the alternative hypothesis.
Figures 4, 5 show the log Bayes factor as a function of the scale
parameter r of the Cauchy prior for the “good” and “bad” evalu-
ations, respectively. The dot indicates the result from the default
prior used in the preregistered data analysis. It is evident that, as
the scale parameter r increases (i.e., the prior becomes progres-
sively wider), the Bayes factor increasingly favors the null hypoth-
esis. In addition, it is evident that, even under the prior setting
that favors the alternative hypothesis most (i.e., scale parameter r
very close to zero), the log Bayes factor is close to zero indicating
ambiguous evidence.
For completeness, we also analyzed the data using a frequen-
tist repeated measures 2 (Evaluation: “Good” vs. “Bad”) × 2
FIGURE 5 | A robustness analysis for the data of bad judgments from
Experiment 1. The log Bayes factor log(BF01) is plotted as a function of the
scale parameter r of the Cauchy prior for the effect size under the alternative
hypothesis. The dot indicates the result from the default prior, the horizontal
black dashed line indicates complete ambiguous evidence, and the horizontal
dashed gray lines indicate strong evidence either in favor of the null hypothesis
[i.e., log(BF01) ≥ log(10)] or in favor of the alternative hypothesis [i.e., log(BF01)
≤ log(1/10)].
(Instruction: Congruent vs. Incongruent) analysis of variance
(ANOVA). Although congruent lever movements were faster
(M = 1176ms, SE = 31) than incongruent lever movements
(M = 1216ms, SE = 33), this difference did not reach signif-
icance [F(1, 97) < 1, n.s.]. Additionally, “good” evaluations were
given faster than “bad” evaluations [F(1, 97) = 36.52, p < 0.005,
η
2
p = 0.274; Mgood = 1156ms, SEgood = 21; Mbad = 1236ms,
SEbad = 26]. This main effect of judgment was the opposite
of that obtained by CB (i.e., “bad” evaluations were faster than
“good” evaluations). As shown inTable 1, this main effect of eval-
uative judgment was qualified by a two-way interaction between
evaluative judgment and lever movement that almost reached the
0.05 level of significance [F(1, 97) = 3.02, p = 0.085; η
2
p = 0.030]:
Pulling the lever with “good” evaluations was somewhat faster
than pushing [F(1, 97) = 0.18, n.s.], whereas pulling the lever with
negative words was somewhat slower than pushing [F(1, 97) =
1.38, p = 0.243], perhaps providing a weak indication of congru-
ency (i.e., the alternative hypothesis) as obtained in CB. No other
effects reached the 0.10 level of marginal significance.
The importance of the Two-Way interaction was also assessed
with the help of a Bayesian ANOVA (Rouder et al., 2012) with
participants as a random factor, which equals a repeatedmeasures
ANOVA. The Bayes factor of interest contrasts the full model that
includes both the main effects and the interaction to a simpler
model that includes only the main effects. The Bayes factor indi-
cates that the data support the two models to an equal extent (i.e.,
BF01 = 1.20).
In sum, our preregistered Bayesian hypothesis tests yielded
evidence in favor of the null hypothesis, although the strength
of this evidence was not compelling. The exploratory Bayesian
ANOVA suggested that the data do not favor the alternative
hypothesis over the null hypothesis. From a Bayesian perspec-
tive, the data certainly did not support the hypothesis as proposed
by CB although our experiment included almost twice as many
participants (n = 52 in Experiment 1 of CB). Our post-hoc fre-
quentist data analysis, however, did indicate some weak evidence
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in favor of the alternative hypothesis, consistent with the origi-
nal CB findings. Although we did not find a general congruency
effect as reported by CB we did obtain an interaction indicative
of a similar congruency between affective evaluation and lever
movement.
The discrepancy between the outcome of the frequentist and
Bayesian hypothesis tests arguably reflects the shortcomings of
p-value based null hypothesis significance testing. Despite its
widespread use, most psychologists fail to recognize that p-
values overestimate the amount of statistical evidence against
the null hypothesis (e.g., Berger and Delampady, 1987; Wagen-
makers, 2007; Wetzels et al., 2011; Johnson, 2013). When
researchers compute p-values, they only consider the plausi-
bility of the data given the null hypothesis and ignore the
possibility that the data may be similarly implausible given
the alternative hypothesis (Berkson, 1938; Wagenmakers et al.,
2015). Note also that, contrary to Bayes factors, p-values can-
not be used to quantify evidence in favor of the null hypoth-
esis; within the frequentist framework one can only fail to
reject the null. The fact that Bayes factors can be used to
obtain evidence for the absence of a hypothesized effect makes
Bayes inference particularly useful for assessing the success of
replication studies.
In comparison with the (corrected for publication bias) small
to medium sized effect size reported in Phaf et al. (2014) the
effect size in this experiment seems very low even though we
tested almost twice as many participants than CB did. Figure 6
shows the posterior distribution of the effect size for the two pre-
registered comparisons (i.e., for “good” evaluations in the left
panel, and for “bad” evaluations in the right panel). The posterior
distribution quantifies the uncertainty about the effect size given
the observed data. It is evident, that in the case of the “good”
evaluations, most posterior mass is around 0; in the case of the
“bad” evaluations, the posterior distribution is slightly shifted to
positive values.
Experiment 2
Method
Pre-Registered Sampling Plan
A frequentist analysis would start with an assessment of the effect
size of Experiment 2 from CB which would then form the basis
of a power analysis. As for Experiment 1, however, our analysis is
based on monitoring the Bayes factors of the critical hypothesis
tests (detailed below).
Specifically, our sampling plan was as follows: We first set
out to collect a minimum of 30 participants in a within-subject
design. Next we planned to monitor the Bayes factors and stop
the experiment whenever both critical hypothesis tests (detailed
below) reached a Bayes factor that could be considered “strong”
evidence (Jeffreys, 1961); this means that the Bayes factor should
be either 10 in favor of the null hypothesis, or 10 in favor of the
alternative hypothesis. The experiment would also stop whenever
we would first reach themaximumnumber of participants, which
we set to 50 participants. Finally, the experiment would also stop
on January 1st, 2014, in case neither of the two other criteria had
been met. As was the case for Experiment 1, data collection for
Experiment 2 was terminated because the maximum number of
participants was reached.
Participants
We recruited 56 students from the University of Amsterdam. Six
participants were excluded for the following reasons: three par-
ticipants did not operate the lever as instructed; two participants
did not receive the correct instructions due to technical failure;
and one left-handed participant was excluded because the exper-
imental setup was not positioned correctly (i.e., at the left side).
The remaining 50 participants (10 male, mean age = 21.3 year,
SD= 3.5) were all native Dutch speakers and had not participated
in Experiment 1. Participants were rewarded with course credits
or e5. All participants were informed about the procedure with
FIGURE 6 | Prior (dashed line) and posterior (solid line) distribution of
the effect size d in Experiment 1 for positive judgments (left panel)
and negative judgments (right panel). The horizontal black dashed line
indicates complete ambiguous evidence, and the horizontal dashed gray lines
indicate strong evidence either in favor of the null hypothesis [i.e., log(BF01)
≥ log(10)] or in favor of the alternative hypothesis [i.e., log(BF01) ≤ log(1/10)].
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an information brochure and subsequently signed an informed
consent form.
Materials and Procedure
The same materials used in Experiment 1 were also used in
Experiment 2, except that “worms” was now included in the stim-
ulus set, resulting in a total of 78 targets (i.e., 39 positive tar-
gets and 39 negative targets). The procedure differed only with
respect to instructions given (See Appendix B in Supplementary
Material, instructions a and b). In contrast to Experiment 1, par-
ticipants were not instructed to evaluate the targets affectively.
Instead, and in accordance with CB, participants were told that
the experiment was about responding as quickly as possible to
the mere presentation of the words. We alternately assigned par-
ticipants to a condition in which they either always pushed the
lever away from themselves (Instruction a) or always pulled the
lever toward themselves (Instruction b). To discourage antici-
pation based on timing, targets were presented after a random
delay from 2 to 7 s. The original study by CB did not include such
random delays. We added this feature to the design in order to
prevent timed responding based on fixed delays.
After half of the trials had been completed, a text appeared
on screen to inform the participants that instructions would now
change and that they had to switch lever movement direction
from pushing to pulling (or vice versa). Additionally, the exper-
imenter returned to the room to explain the new instructions
and to ensure that the participants had understood them. Across
all participants in CB’s Experiment 2, the targets were presented
in a fixed order. Although not explicated in CB, this may have
been done to ensure the presence of an equal number of positive
and negative objects as well as an equal number of weak attitude
objects in both conditions (for details see CB). We followed these
constraints but presented our targets in a semi-random fashion;
targets were randomly drawn without replacement from two dif-
ferent lists containing 19 positive targets and 20 negative targets
or 20 positive targets and 19 negative targets, respectively. For
every participant the order of both lists was the same.
Preregistered Data Analysis and Presentation of
Results
Our data analysis closely followed that of Experiment 1, the main
exception being that the design was fully within-subjects instead
of between-subjects with regard to the association between
affective valence of the targets and specific lever movement. As
outlined in the preregistration document, we followed the rea-
soning of CB and treated response times above 1500ms and
below 300ms as outliers, and excluded them from the analysis
(pulling with positive words: 2.4%; pulling with negative words:
1.2%; pushing with positive words: 1.6%; pushing with negative
words: 1.7%). As in Experiment 1, and as outlined in the preregis-
tration document, the dependent measure was the mean log(10)-
transformed response latency for every participant. The crucial
hypothesis (i.e., alternative hypothesis) concerned the interaction
that describes the congruency effect. Specifically, the congruency
effect can be decomposed in two directional hypotheses: the first
hypothesis states that participants respond faster to a positive
target by pulling instead of pushing a lever; the second hypoth-
esis states that participants respond faster to a negative target by
pushing instead of pulling a lever. Both hypotheses were assessed
separately by means of two default Bayes factors for paired, one-
sided t-tests as outlined in Rouder et al. (2009) and Wetzels et al.
(2009). Specifically, for the distribution for effect size under the
alternative hypothesis we used a folded Cauchy(0,1) distribution.
Exploratory analyses will vary the shape of this prior to probe the
robustness of our conclusions.
Bayes factors quantify the support that the data provide for
the null hypothesis vis-a-vis the alternative hypothesis. Support
in favor of the alternative hypotheses constitutes support in favor
of the effects reported by CB in their Experiment 2.
Results
Bayes Factor Hypothesis Tests
As Table 1 shows, for positive words participants were somewhat
faster to pull (M = 562, SE = 13) the lever than to push it
(M = 571, SE = 14). For negative words participants were some-
what faster to push the lever (M = 562, SE = 13) than to pull
it (M = 574, SE = 12). For positive words, the comparison
of the two lever movements yielded BF01 = 3.10; for negative
words, it yielded BF01 = 1.11. In other words, for both positive
and negative words we obtained “anecdotal” evidence (Jeffreys,
1961) in favor of the null hypothesis: the data are only about
twice as likely under the null hypothesis as under the alterna-
tive hypothesis. Figures 7, 8 display the development of the log
Bayes factor as a function of the number of participants for the
positive words and the negative words, respectively. For positive
words, the Bayes factor fluctuated heavily throughout the exper-
iment, sometimes indicating anecdotal evidence in favor of the
null hypothesis, and sometimes indicating anecdotal to moder-
ate evidence for the alternative hypothesis. At the end of the data
collection, the Bayes factor indicated moderate evidence for the
absence of the congruency effect. For negative words, the Bayes
factor initially indicated moderate to strong evidence in favor of
the alternative hypothesis. However, after testing 33 participants,
the Bayes factor support in favor of the alternative hypothesis
started to lessen; at the end of data collection, the Bayes factor
indicated that the evidence is almost perfectly ambiguous.
Exploratory Analysis
To probe the robustness of our conclusions, we varied the shape
of the prior for the effect size under the alternative hypothesis.
Figures 9, 10 show the log Bayes factor as a function of the scale
parameter r of the Cauchy prior for the positive and negative
words, respectively. The dot indicates the result from the default
prior used in the preregistered data analysis. It is evident that, as
the scale parameter r increases (i.e., the prior becomes progres-
sively wider), the Bayes factor increasingly favors the null hypoth-
esis. In addition, it is evident that, even under the prior setting
that favors the alternative hypothesis most (i.e., scale parameter r
very close to zero), the log Bayes factor is close to zero indicating
ambiguous evidence.
For completeness, we also analyzed the data using a frequen-
tist ANOVA (Table 1). Congruent lever movements were some-
what faster (M = 562ms, SE = 13) than incongruent lever
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FIGURE 7 | Development of the log Bayes factor as a function of the
number of participants for the positive words in Experiment 2. N =
sample size; BF01 = Bayes factor in favor of the null hypothesis; H0 = null
hypothesis; H1 = alternative hypothesis. The horizontal black dashed line
indicates complete ambiguous evidence, and the horizontal dashed gray
lines indicate strong evidence either in favor of the null hypothesis [i.e.,
log(BF01) ≥ log(10)] or in favor of the alternative hypothesis [i.e., log(BF01) ≤
log(1/10)].
FIGURE 8 | Development of the log Bayes factor as a function of the
number of participants for the negative words in Experiment 2. N =
sample size; BF01 = Bayes factor in favor of the null hypothesis; H0 = null
hypothesis; H1 = alternative hypothesis. The horizontal black dashed line
indicates complete ambiguous evidence, and the horizontal dashed gray
lines indicate strong evidence either in favor of the null hypothesis [i.e.,
log(BF01) ≥ log(10)] or in favor of the alternative hypothesis [i.e., log(BF01) ≤
log(1/10)].
movements [M = 573ms, SE = 13; t(49) = 1.713, p = 0.093].
In line with this observation, a repeated measures 2 (Affec-
tive valence: Positive vs. Negative) × 2 (Lever movement: Pull
vs. Push) ANOVA indicated a marginally significant Two-Way
interaction [F(1, 49) = 2.93, p = 0.09, η
2
p = 0.057]: Pulling
the lever with positive words was a little faster [t(49) = 1.054,
p = 0.297.] than pushing, whereas pulling the lever with nega-
tive words [t(49) = 1.742, p = 0.088] was slower than pushing.
This result perhaps provides a weak indication of congruency
(i.e., the alternative hypothesis) as obtained in CB’s Experiment
2. No other effects reached the 0.10 level of marginal significance.
The importance of the Two-Way interaction was also assessed
with the help of a Bayesian ANOVA (Rouder et al., 2012) with
participants as a random factor, which equals a repeatedmeasures
ANOVA. The Bayes factor of interest contrasts the full model
that includes both the main effects and the interaction to a sim-
pler model that includes only the main effects. The Bayes fac-
tor slightly favored the model without the interaction term (i.e.,
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BF01 = 4.28), that is, the observed data are 4.28 times more likely
under the model without the interaction compared to the model
with the interaction.
In sum, as was the case for Experiment 1, our preregistered
Bayesian hypothesis tests yielded evidence in favor of the null
hypothesis, although the strength of this evidence was rather
modest. Figure 11 shows the posterior distribution of the effect
size for the two preregistered comparisons (i.e., for positive words
in the left panel, and for negative words in the right panel). It is
evident, that in the case of both hypotheses, the posterior distri-
bution is only slightly shifted to positive values. From a Bayesian
perspective, the data certainly did not support the CB hypothe-
ses. Our exploratory frequentist data analysis indicated some
weak evidence in line with the original CB findings. This finding,
FIGURE 9 | A robustness analysis for the data of positive words from
Experiment 2. The log Bayes factor log(BF01) is plotted as a function of the
scale parameter r of the Cauchy prior for the effect size under the alternative
hypothesis. The dot indicates the result from the default prior, the horizontal
black dashed line indicates complete ambiguous evidence, and the horizontal
dashed gray lines indicate strong evidence either in favor of the null hypothesis
[i.e., log(BF01) ≥ log(10)] or in favor of the alternative hypothesis [i.e., log(BF01)
≤ log(1/10)].
however, is in contrast with the results obtained in the meta-
analyses reported in Phaf et al. (2014, see also Laham et al., 2014)
that seems to suggest the absence of any automatic congruency
effect.
Discussion and Concluding Comments
Our attempts to replicate the CB experiments did not succeed:
for both replication attempts, the preregistered Bayesian hypoth-
esis tests showed that the data provided more evidence for the
null hypotheses than for the alternative hypotheses. The strength
of this evidence is certainly not compelling, but the results do
suggest that additional direct preregistered replications of the CB
experiments are called for.
FIGURE 10 | A robustness analysis for the data of negative words from
Experiment 2. The log Bayes factor log(BF01) is plotted as a function of the
scale parameter r of the Cauchy prior for the effect size under the alternative
hypothesis. The dot indicates the result from the default prior, the horizontal
black dashed line indicates complete ambiguous evidence, and the horizontal
dashed gray lines indicate strong evidence either in favor of the null hypothesis
[i.e., log(BF01) ≥ log(10)] or in favor of the alternative hypothesis [i.e., log(BF01)
≤ log(1/10)].
FIGURE 11 | Prior (dashed line) and posterior (solid line) distribution of the effect size δ in Experiment 2 for positive words (left panel) and negative
words (right panel).
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Using a frequentist ANOVA, exploratory analyses of Exper-
iment 1 and Experiment 2 revealed a weak indication for
congruency, expressed through interaction effects that were
both marginally significant. These results were not, however,
corroborated by a Bayesian ANOVA, which again provided weak
evidence in favor of the absence of an interaction. This inconsis-
tency arises as a result of the statistical peculiarities of p-values. As
explained earlier, p-value-based inference overstates the amount
of evidence against the null hypothesis because it fails to consider
the extremeness of the data under the alternative hypothesis.
Nevertheless, the evidence for the presence of the effects is weak
to non-existent, even if we focus on the most favorable analysis
(i.e., the exploratory frequentist ANOVA producing marginally
significant results.
Although we attempted to duplicate the original experimental
setup as accurately as possible there were of course small differ-
ences in the experimental setup and procedure that can maybe
account for the differences in results. First, in our experimen-
tal setup participants had to move their hand a bit more than
in the original setup. This could have resulted in less easy move-
ments, for instance, maybe interfering with the congruency effect.
When trying out both trajectories ourselves though we could not
feel any more interference in the longer one we used than in the
shorter one used by CB; hence, we do not believe this difference
can explain the discrepant results. Moreover, latencies obtained
in our experiment were faster than the original latencies suggest-
ing that when any of such interference took place it certainly did
not slow down our participants. Second, we used fewer words in
our experiments (resp., 77 and 78 out of 92) than CB (i.e., 82
out of 92) assuming that targets used for practice trials in the
original experiment were not used in the actual experiments and
reported results. Of course this difference was due to our efforts
to get our stimulus set to resemble the original stimulus set used
by CB as close as possible so we do not think this difference can
explain the discrepant results either. Third, in our experiments
targets were randomly presented (Experiment 1) as well as semi-
randomly (Experiment 2) whereas the original authors used a
single randomly ordered list of words in both experiments. If this
difference could explain the discrepant results we should prob-
ably conclude that the original findings are due to experimental
noise alone but this would contrast again with our findings and
the findings in Phaf et al. (2014, see also Laham et al., 2014). In
sum, we do not think that these differences in experimental setup
and procedure can account for the differences in results obtained
by us and CB. But we are aware that we of course do not know all
differences since we could rely only on specifics provided in the
original report.
It seems clear that although we failed to replicate CB using our
pre-registered Bayesian analyses we cannot conclude that there
is no link between affective evaluation and approach-avoidance
behavior. First, the evidence in favor of the null hypothesis is
not compelling and stems from only two experiments. Second,
using exploratory frequentist statistics we found weak evidence
for this link. Third, a recent meta-analysis (Phaf et al., 2014; see
also Laham et al., 2014) shows ample evidence for the presence of
this link. Phaf et al. included studies on approach and avoidance
behavior using different experimental paradigms (e.g., joystick,
manikin) and, after correcting for publication bias, reported evi-
dence for the presence of a moderate congruency effect between
explicit affective evaluation and approach and avoidance behav-
ior. Additionally, no evidence was obtained in this meta-analysis
for such a direct link in case of implicit affective evaluation as in
our Experiment 2.
In addition, we were also unable to replicate the main
effect of evaluative judgment (Experiment 1) and affective
meaning (Experiment 2) that was obtained by CB. In Exper-
iment 1 of CB, negative evaluations were faster than positive
evaluations; in Experiment 2 of CB, participants responded
faster to negative than to positive words. In contrast, in our
Experiment 1 we found that positive evaluations were faster
than negative evaluations; in our Experiment 2, there was no
evidence that affective meaning influenced lever movement
in the absence of explicit affective evaluation. This finding
and the aforementioned findings suggests that the pattern of
results obtained by CB may be more fragile than previously
thought.
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